



Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Lau, M.I. and Poutvaara, P. (2006) ’Social security incentives and human capital investment.’, Finnish
economic papers., 19 (1). pp. 16-24.





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Finnish Economic Papers – Volume 19 – Number 1 – Spring 2006
16
SOCIAL SECURITY INCENTIVES
AND HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT*
MORTEN I. LAU
Department of Economics and Finance,




P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland,
Email: panu.poutvaara@helsinki.fi
While the effect of social security systems on retirement decisions has received much
attention, there are no analytical results on the impact of these systems on individual
incentives to invest in human capital. We integrate human capital investment and
retirement decisions in an analytical life-cycle model with full certainty and inves-
tigate how different social security schemes may affect human capital investment 
and labor supply. We analyze and compare three different social security systems,
differing on whether benefits are conditional on withdrawal from the labor market
and on previous income. (JEL: H55, I21, J26)
1. Introduction
In this paper, we extend the previous literature
by integrating human capital investment and
retirement decisions in an analytical life-cy-
cle model. While the effect of social security
systems on retirement decisions has received
much attention, the impact of these systems on
individual incentives to invest in human capital
has not been analyzed analytically. The effect 
of social security system on the incentives of
the previous generation to invest in the public
education provided to the future generation has 
been analyzed already by Pogue and Sgontz
(1977). We study the effects of social security
rules on private human capital investment and
retirement. 
Our analysis highlights two important fea-
tures of social security systems: (i) actuarial ad-
justment, and (ii) the link between individual
*We are indebted for useful comments to Saku Aura, Bob
Chirinko, Uli Hange, Vesa Kanniainen, Marko Köthen-
bürger, Steinar Strøm, Marcel Thum, Alfons Weichenrieder,
two anonymous referees and the editor of this journal, and
seminar participants at the Center for Economic Studies in
Munich, and the participants of the 6th Spring Meeting of
Young Economists, held in CopenhagenMarch 30 – April 1,
2001. The usual disclaimer applies. This paper was started
while Poutvaara was Visiting Fellow at Harvard University
and revised while he visited the Center for Economic Stud-
ies in Munich. The hospitality of both institutions is grate-
fully acknowledged. We acknowledge financial support from
the Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation. 
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social security contributions and benefits. We
expect that actuarial adjustment encourages lat-
er retirement because the present value of social
security benefits is unaffected by the retirement
age, and we expect that the link between social
security contributions and benefits has a posi-
tive effect on human capital investment because
the return on human capital investment increas-
es. Finally, we analyze the interaction between
these two links. How does actuarial adjustment 
affect human capital investment, and how does 
the link between social security contributions 
and benefits affect retirement behavior?
Since uncertainty and ability differences are
absent, social security cannot offer efficiency
gains in our framework. However, Browning
(1975) and Cooley and Soares (1999) have dem-
onstrated that social security systems may be
maintained as a voting equilibrium, even when
young generations are hurt. As past contribu-
tions are sunk costs, the old and middle-aged
generations may vote for redistributive reasons 
in favor of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system.We
do not replicate the analysis of a voting game,
but take social security rules as given. Instead
of asking what the optimal social security sys-
tem would be, we focus on the consequences 
for steady state generations of adopting alterna-
tive social security rules. 
We analyze and compare the effects of three
different social security components on private
retirement and education decisions. Social se-
curity benefits are financed by a proportional
tax rate on labor income in each system, and
the three components include: (i) flat-rate old-
age benefits paid to individuals who are older
than a given entitlement age, (ii) flat-rate retire-
ment subsidies paid to retired individuals, and
(iii) earnings-related retirement subsidies paid
to retired individuals as a proportion of wage
income during a given period before retirement. 
By naming the first component “old-age ben-
efits”, we highlight that these benefits are not
conditional on withdrawal from the labor mar-
ket. Retirement subsidies, on the other hand,
are conditional on withdrawal from the labor 
market, thus effectively subsidizing retirement. 
The first component is actuarially fair, because
the present value of social security benefits is
independent of the retirement age. The last two
components do not include actuarial adjust-
ment. The third component introduces a link be-
tween social security contributions and benefits,
whereas social security benefits do not depend
on past contributions in the first two compo-
nents.We do not focus on earnings-related old-
age benefits, because this system would repli-
cate the market outcome in our framework. 
We include both private human capital in-
vestment and retirement decisions. The duration
of education is kept constant, and the level of
human capital depends on effort and resources 
devoted by the individual to education. Effort 
could also include the monetarized value of
time used to study. As we do not want to take
stance on how time, effort, and other expenses 
are combined in the production of human capi-
tal, we do not include explicitly a choice of time
devoted to studies. 
Our results suggest that actuarial social se-
curity schemes encourage later retirement and
thus increase the incentive to invest in human
capital compared to non-actuarial schemes.We
also find that a stronger correspondence be-
tween earnings history and social security ben-
efits increases the incentive to invest in human
capital and postpones retirement. 
Most related to our paper, Jensen, Lau and
Poutvaara (2004) study the effects of alternative
social security rules on human capital forma-
tion, retirement and welfare using a computa-
tional general equilibrium model. Our paper 
complements theirs in four respects. First, this 
paper derives the effects of social security rules 
analytically, rather than numerically. Second,
Jensen et al. (2004) analyze the productivity
process in which human capital formation con-
tinues over the whole life-time, and there is no
period of formal schooling. This paper studies 
formal education which takes place before entry
into the labor market. Third, this paper assumes 
that education has effort costs, while Jensen et 
al. assume that it only has time costs. Fourth,
Jensen et al. (2004) compare only systems in
which the link between previous earnings and
benefit rate is either linear or non-existent, while
the analytical framework of this paper allows 
deriving results for arbitrary convex combina-
tions of different systems. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The model
is first introduced without social security in Sec-
tion 2, and three alternative components of so-
cial security are then introduced and compared
in Section 3. Using general specifications of
production and utility functions, we derive and
compare the economic effects on human capital
investment and retirement of marginal changes 
in the weights of the three social security com-
ponents. In Section 4, we apply a Cobb-Douglas 
specification of the utility function, which al-
lows us to rank all three systems with respect 
to the distortions they cause in human capital
investment and retirement behavior. Section 5
presents a model where investment in human
capital is held constant. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Human capital and retirement with-
out social security
To illustrate how different social security sys-
tems may affect the supply and quality of labor,
we construct a simple life-cycle model with en-
dogenous human capital formation and retire-
ment.After completing education, an individual
decides how long he or she will be active in the
labor market and when to retire. In other words,
the retirement age is endogenous in the model. 
All agents are identical, and we analyze the op-
timal behavior of a representative agent. Public
expenditures are not included in this section.
Human capital investment includes education
obtained at universities and other institutions 
of higher learning, as well as any courses and
training obtained elsewhere. Some inputs have
to be purchased, like tuition and course materi-
al. In addition to purchased inputs, studying re-
quires effort, the utility cost of which we meas-
ure as equivalent units of lifetime consumption. 
Before us, this simplification has been used by
Cremer and Pestieau (2003) to present the util-
ity cost of working as a quadratic loss which is 
deducted from resources available for consump-
tion.We keep time spent on education constant,
while allowing effort to vary. We denote indi-
vidual investment in education by H, measured
as equivalent units of the consumption good,
and refer to it simply as the cost of education. 
The time horizon after education is completed
is normalized at unity for each agent, and there
is no uncertainty about life expectancy or the
return on education. Even though modelling hu-
man capital formation as a pure consumption
expenditure is a strong assumption, the model
could be solved numerically also with an alter-
native assumption that human capital formation
requires also time.1
Perfect competition prevails in each market,
which implies that output and factor prices are
given to all individuals in the model. The price
of the homogeneous consumption good is nor-
malized at unity.We assume that lifetime utility
depends on consumption over the lifetime, and
on time spent on retirement:
in which c(t) is the flow of consumption at time
t, and u(c(t)) denotes utility from consump-
tion at time t, and  is a subjective discount 
factor. The dummy variable ψt obtains value
one if the individual is retired at time t, and
zero otherwise. Retirement is an irreversible
action, implying that with a retirement age
1 — R, ψt = 0 when 0 ≤ t < 1 — R and ψt =
1 when 1 — R ≤ t ≤ 1. The utility flow from
retirement, v(t, ψt), may depend on individual
age t. This allows us to capture, for example,
the possibility that the utility cost of work-
ing could increase with age. We assume that 
v (t,1) > v (t,0)t  [0; 1]. Our assumption that 
utility is separable between consumption and
time spent on retirement considerably simplifies
the analysis. However, this assumes away any
retirement-consumption-drop puzzle. 
The consumption good can be borrowed or 
lent internationally at a zero interest rate. This 
simplification allows us to present lifetime
utility Ũ in a more concise form, as a func-
tion of lifetime consumption C and retirement 
age R:
(1) Ũ = U(C) + V(R).
1 See Jensen et al. (2004) for an analysis in which edu-
cation has only time cost. The similarities and differences 
between Jensen et al. (2004) and this paper are discussed
in section 4.
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We assume that u(c(t)) is a strictly increasing
and concave function of c(t), which suffices
to guarantee that U also is a concave func-
tion of consumption C. The assumption that
d
dt [v(t,1) — v(t, 0)] ≥ 0 is sufficient to guar-
antee that V(R) is a concave function of R. We
assume that lim
C→0+
U(C) = ∞, lim
R→0+
V(R) = ∞ and
lim
H→0+
w(H) = ∞ in order to guarantee interior so-
lutions. The wage rate, w, is a concave function
of human capital investment H, w = w(H).
The lifetime budget constraint states that the
value of lifetime expenditures on consumption
and human capital investment cannot exceed life-
time income from the supply of labor services:
(2) (1 — R) · w(H) = C + H,
where (1 — R) is the duration of working life,
as well as the point in time at which the indi-
vidual retires from the labor market. 
The representative agent maximizes lifetime
utility (1) with regard to H and R subject to the
human capital production function and the life-
time budget constraint (2). The first-order con-
dition with respect to human capital is:
(1— R) · w (H) = 1,
where the left-hand side is the return on human
capital investment, and the right-hand side is 
the opportunity cost in terms of foregone con-
sumption. The first-order condition with respect
to retirement is:
V(R) = w(H) · U (C),
where the left-hand side is the marginal util-
ity of retirement, and the marginal cost on the
right-hand side is equal to foregone labor in-
come times the marginal utility of consumption
goods. These two equations determine optimal
choices of human capital investment and the
duration of retirement. 
3. Human capital investment and re-
tirement with social security
We use the life-cycle model to analyze steady
state effects of a social security system with
three different components. Social security ben-
efits are financed by a proportional tax rate on
labor income, and the three components include
(i) flat-rate old-age benefits paid to individuals
who are older than a given entitlement age, (ii) 
flat-rate retirement subsidies paid to retired in-
dividuals, and (iii) earnings-related retirement 
subsidies paid to retired individuals as a pro-
portion of wage income during a given period
before retirement. The first component is actu-
arially fair, since the present value of social se-
curity benefits is independent of the retirement
age. The last two components do not include ac-
tuarial adjustment, and both systems effectively
subsidize retirement since they drive the private
cost of retirement below the net wage. The third
component introduces a link between social se-
curity contributions and benefits, whereas social
security benefits do not depend on past contri-
butions in the first two components.
3.1 Population and production
We analyze an economy with a continuum of
agents across and within generations. New
agents are born to the economy at a constant 
rate that is equal to the mortality rate, and the
population growth rate is therefore equal to
zero. Without loss of generality, we choose the
indexation of generations such that g  [0, 1]
corresponds to the age of the given generation.2
In other words, the oldest generation has index
one and the youngest generation has index zero. 
Agents are identical within and across genera-
tions, and we analyze the behavior of a repre-
sentative agent. Each generation is associated
with a density function that is equal to one,
which implies that the total population is equal
to one:
Although the model represents a continuum of
overlapping generations, we simplify the anal-
2 We could include two generational indices: one rep-
resenting the point of time, and another representing the
age of each generation. Since we analyze the steady state
equilibrium, we do not need this distinction and thus ex-
clude the time index.
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ysis by excluding generation-specific indices
whenever convenient. 
The production function is linear in human
capital, and there are no other factor inputs in
the model. Prices and quantities are constant 
in steady state because the interest rate and the
growth rate are normalized at zero. Variables do
therefore not carry time indices. 
3.2 Introducing different benefit schemes
In the first social security component, each per-
son is entitled to old-age benefits at age 1 — 6R. 
The old-age benefits are constant and equal to
z per unit of time, which implies that each indi-
vidual receives a lump sum lifetime social se-
curity payment of B 6Rz from the government. 
The benefits are financed by a proportional tax
rate on labor income, 1, and the public budget 
constraint with respect to this component is:
where Hg denotes human capital investment by
generation g. The left-hand side is equal to tax
payments from current generations who work,
and the right-hand side reflects social security
payments to current old generations. Note that 
R and 6R may differ. Since Hg = H, g in steady
state, we can simplify the public budget con-
straint to:
1(1— R) · w(H) = 6Rz = B.
The second social security component includes 
a uniform benefit flow, say a given monthly
benefit to retired persons. The flat-rate retire-
ment subsidy rate is denoted by b, and the pay-
ments are financed by a proportional tax rate on
labor income, 2. In this case, the public budget 
constraint is:
Again, the left-hand side is equal to tax pay-
ments from current generations who work, and
the right-hand side is equal to social security
payments to current old generations. Simplifi-
cation yields 
2(1— R) · w(H) = Rb.
Finally, we introduce a social security compo-
nent in which benefits depend on wage income
during a given period before retirement. In par-
ticular, social security benefits are determined
as a proportion, p, of wage income during a
period, n, before retirement.3 Defining x  np,
social security benefits for individual i are de-
termined by:
bi = x · w(Hi),
where x is, from the individual’s perspective,
an exogenous fraction of the wage rate. From
the government’s perspective, x is endogenous 
to satisfy the budget constraint. The earnings-
related retirement subsidies are financed by a
proportional tax rate, 3, on labor income, and
the public budget constraint is given by:
where the left-hand side is equal to tax pay-
ments from individuals who work. The right-
hand side is equal to aggregate social security
payments to retired generations. Since all indi-
viduals are identical in the model,
3(1— R) · w(H) = Rx · w(H).
Combining the three social security systems,
the budget constraint for the representative
agent is:
(4) (1 — 1 — 2 — 3)(1 — R) · w(H) + B + 
Rb + Rx · w(H) = C + H. 
The three social security components introduce
distortions in the economic decision making. A
system with perfect correspondence between an
3 Since the wage rate is constant in the model, the
length of the period is not important to the results, unless 
the period is sufficiently long to postpone retirement.
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individual’s own social security tax payments 
and benefits received would in our framework
replicate the solution without social security. 
3.3 Incentive effects of social security
The representative agent maximizes lifetime
utility (1) subject to the lifetime budget con-
straint (4). The first-order condition with respect
to human capital investment is:
[(1 — 1 — 2 — 3)(1 — R) · w + Rx · w
— 1]U = 0,
and the first-order condition with respect to re-
tirement is:
(5) [—(1 — 1 — 2 — 3) · w + b + x · w]
U + V = 0.
The first-order condition with respect to human
capital investment simplifies to:
(1 — 1 — 2 — 3)(1 — R) · w + Rx · w = 1,
where the left-hand side is the return on human
capital investment and the right-hand side is 
the opportunity cost in terms of foregone con-
sumption. The second term on the left-hand side
measures the return on human capital invest-
ment through its effects on social security ben-
efits. Social security taxes decrease the return
on human capital investment, whereas earnings-
related retirement subsidies partially offset this 
decrease.4 The first-order condition with respect
to retirement can be written as:
V = [(1 — 1 — 2 — 3) · w — b — x · w]U,
where the left-hand side is the marginal util-
ity of retirement, and the marginal cost on the
right-hand side is equal to the net income loss 
due to retirement times the marginal utility of
consumption goods. Note that both social secu-
4 It is useful to contrast our results with Heckman
(1976). Heckman assumes that the demand for leisure is 
constant and the opportunity cost of human capital invest-
ment is equal to foregone labor income. With those assump-
tions, labor income taxes are non-distortionary.
rity taxes and retirement subsidies reduce the
marginal cost of retirement. 
Using Cramer’s rule, we analyze and com-
pare the three different social security com-
ponents with respect to private retirement and
education decisions. The results (proofs avail-
able on the web page of this journal) can be
summarized as:
Proposition 1 An increase in the tax rate to
finance any component of the social security
system discourages human capital investment 
and encourages early retirement. 
Proposition 2 Increasing the share of flat-rate
retirement subsidies at the expense of either 
flat-rate old-age benefits or earnings-related re-
tirement subsidies discourages human capital
investment and encourages early retirement. 
The social security system affects human capital
investment in two ways. First, it may change the
return on human capital investment at any given
retirement age. The system in which social se-
curity benefits depend on wage income before
retirement encourages human capital investment 
compared to systems without the link. Second,
the social security system may indirectly affect 
human capital investment through the impact on
retirement age, which affects the amortization
period of human capital investment. We find
that actuarial adjustment has a positive effect on
human capital investment, because it postpones 
retirement. Hence, replacing earnings-related
retirement subsidies or flat-rate old-age benefits
with flat-rate retirement subsidies discourages
human capital investment.
Retirement decisions are also affected in two
ways by the social security system. First, social
security benefits lower the private opportunity
cost of retirement. The private opportunity cost 
of retirement is reduced by the retirement ben-
efit in the two non-actuarial social security sys-
tems compared to the actuarial system. Replac-
ing flat-rate old-age benefits with flat-rate retire-
ment subsidies thus encourages early retirement. 
Second, the social security system indirectly
affects the retirement age through human capi-
tal investment, since the level of human capital
affects individual productivity. Increasing the
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share of flat-rate retirement subsidies compared
to earnings-related retirement subsidies there-
fore encourages early retirement.
It is not possible to say anything decisive
about education and retirement decisions across 
the flat-rate old-age benefit and earnings-related
retirement subsidy components. We relegate
this issue to the next section, where we restrict 
the lifetime utility function to be of the Cobb-
Douglas variety. 
4. Cobb-Douglas specification
We next apply a Cobb-Douglas specification of
the utility function and assume that each agent 
maximizes:
(6) Ũ = ln(C) + βln(R),
where β > 0 is the relative weight of utility from
retirement. The individual stock of human capi-
tal is determined by Hα, where 0 < α < 1. The
marginal productivity of human capital invest-
ment is thus diminishing, which implies that 
human capital investment is strictly positive and
bounded. The representative individual maxi-
mizes lifetime utility, (6) subject to the lifetime
budget constraint:
(7) (1— 1— 2 — 3)(1— R) · Hα + B + Rb
+ Rx · Hα = C + H.
The first term on the left-hand side is lifetime
wage income after tax, the second term is the
sum of flat-rate old-age benefits, the third term
is the sum of flat-rate retirement subsidies, and
the fourth term is the sum of earnings-related
retirement subsidies. Solving the individual
maximization problem, we find that the first-
order conditions with respect to human capital
investment and retirement simplify to
(8)
(9)
These two equations allow us to compare in-
centive effects across flat-rate old-age benefit
and earnings-related retirement subsidy com-
ponents. The results are derived in Appendix
A, and they show:
Proposition 3 Increasing the share of earnings-
related retirement subsidies at the expense of
flat-rate old-age benefits increases human capi-
tal investment and leads to earlier retirement. 
This proposition suggests that the link between
social security contributions and benefits is
more important than the actuarial link with
respect to human capital investment, whereas 
actuarial adjustment is more important with
respect to retirement decisions. The intuitive
explanation is that first-order effects (the ef-
fect of linking benefits to earnings on human
capital investment, and the effect of actuarial
adjustment on retirement age) are more impor-
tant than second-order effects (the effect of re-
tirement decision on human capital investment 
and the effect of human capital investment on
retirement decision). 
Using a Cobb-Douglas representation of the
lifetime utility function, the results of proposi-
tions 2 and 3 can be summarized as:
Proposition 4 Measured by human capital in-
vestment, the descending order of the three
social security systems is: earnings-related re-
tirement subsidies, flat-rate old-age benefits and
flat-rate retirement subsidies. Measured by the
retirement age, the descending order is: flat-rate
old-age benefits, earnings-related retirement
subsidies and flat-rate retirement subsidies.
The results we have derived with Cobb-Doug-
las specification are in line with the results that
Jensen et al. (2004) derive using a computational
general equilibriummodel with a different utility
function. They assume a life-cycle with 60 peri-
ods with the periodic utility function from con-
sumption being of constant relative risk aversion,
and utility from leisure being quadratic. Also
they find that whether there are old-age benefits
or retirement subsidies is more important for re-
tirement behavior than whether benefits are earn-
ings-related. However, they assume that human
capital formation continues over the life time. 
Education has only time cost, and is thus effec-
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tively tax deductible. This paper complements 
theirs by deriving the effects of social security
rules in the case when education takes place be-
fore entry into the labor market, and has non-de-
ductible costs, whether monetary or effort. This 
paper complements Jensen et al. (2004) also by
deriving the effects analytically. Their numerical
results, in turn, serve as sensitivity analysis for 
the analytical results derived here. 
5. Results with exogenous 
human capital
We next demonstrate the importance of allow-
ing for endogenous human capital formation by
comparing the results with predictions from the
same model with exogenous human capital for-
mation instead. In the terminology of our mod-
el, exogenous human capital formation amounts 
to assuming that H is fixed at 6H. This leaves the
individual maximization problem, apart from
intertemporal allocation of consumption, with
only one decision variable, R, and subsequently
one first-order condition, (5). We prove in Ap-
pendix B:
Proposition 5 When human capital investment 
is exogenous, earnings-related retirement subsi-
dies and flat-rate retirement subsidies are equiv-
alent in their effects on the timing of retirement. 
With a given social security tax rate, an increase
in either component at the expense of flat-rate
old-age benefits leads to earlier retirement.
Proposition 5 suggests that flat-rate retirement
subsidies are equally distorting as earnings-re-
lated retirement subsidies, and both are more
distorting than flat-rate old-age benefits. This
is in marked contrast with the previous results 
where human capital formation is endogenous. 
With endogenous human capital formation, flat-
rate retirement subsidies always result in larger 
distortions than the two other systems. 
6. Conclusions and implications 
We have analyzed the interaction between social
security rules, human capital investment, and
the timing of retirement. Our results highlight 
two important links in social security systems:
(i) actuarial adjustment and (ii) the link between
contributions made and benefits received. We
find that actuarially adjusted systems lead to lat-
er retirement than systems with a weaker actu-
arial adjustment. This result corresponds to the
empirical finding by Börsch-Supan (2000), who
suggests that retirement before age 60 would
be reduced by more than a third if the German
social security system were reformed and made
actuarially fair. We also find that the link be-
tween benefits and contributions encourages
human capital investment. The results stress 
the importance of incentives embedded in so-
cial security rules, since distortions arise even
when agents are identical and redistribution is 
absent in equilibrium. 
Since uncertainty and ability differences are
not present, social security can not offer effi-
ciency gains in our framework. However, the
public finance literature identifies several ways
in which redistribution may improve welfare
and efficiency when uncertainty is present. For
example, Sinn (1997) suggests that adverse se-
lection problems may exclude a private insur-
ance market for career risk. When agents have
private knowledge of their productivity, any
provider of voluntary income redistribution con-
tracts would suffer from adverse selection prob-
lems. Diamond andMirrlees (1986) analyze the
optimal structure of social security benefits with
exogenous productivity and disability risk. In
both of these contributions, redistributive taxa-
tion can be interpreted as a substitute for the
missing private insurance market. An optimal
social security system should balance these ben-
efits of redistribution against the costs outlined
in our study. In any case, our results call for 
devoting proper attention to incentives concern-
ing human capital formation when considering
reforms in social security policy. An important 
challenge for future work would be to evaluate
empirically the relationship between social se-
curity systems and human capital investments. 
In addition to the incentive effects highlighted
here, such an empirical study should take into
account also differences in general wage taxa-
tion. 
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Appendix A
Retirement and human capital across benefit
schemes
Maximizing the Cobb-Douglas specification of
lifetime utility (6) subject to the lifetime budget 
constraint (7) yields the following first-order
conditions:
(A1)
(1— 1 — 2 — 3)(1— R)α Hα—1 + RαHα—1x— 1 = 0
C
(A2)
— (1— 1 — 2 — 3)Hα + b + Hαx + β = 0C R
The public budget constraint for the flat-
rate old-age benefit component is B = 1 (1
— R)Hα, that for flat-rate retirement subsidies
is b = 2 1 — R HαR , and that for earnings-relatedretirement subsidies is x = 3 1 — RR . When wesubstitute these expressions into (A1) and (A2),
we obtain:
(A3) (1 — 1 — 2)(1 — R)αHα—1 — 1 = 0,
(A4) — (1 — 1)RHα + 2Hα + 3Hα + 
β((1— R)Hα— H) = 0.
(A3) and (A4) yield (8) and (9). We differenti-
ate (8) and (9) with respect to 1 and 3 such
that d3 = —d1. These derivations reveal that dH
d3 = —d1 < 0d1
and dR d3 = —d1 < 0d1 . 
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 5
We totally differentiate the first-order condition
(5) with respect to the individual decision vari-
able R and social security tax rates 1, 2, and
3. We obtain:
this yields
